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Abstract—Participatory sensing has emerged recently as a
promising approach to large-scale data collection. However, with-
out incentives for users to regularly contribute good quality data,
this method is unlikely to be viable in the long run. In this paper,
we link incentive to users’ demand for consuming compelling
services, as an approach complementary to conventional credit or
reputation based approaches. With this demand-based principle,
we design two incentive schemes, Incentive with Demand Fairness
(IDF) and Iterative Tank Filling (ITF), for maximizing fairness
and social welfare, respectively. Our study shows that the IDF
scheme is max-min fair and can score close to 1 on the Jain’s
fairness index, while the ITF scheme maximizes social welfare
and achieves a unique Nash equilibrium which is also Pareto and
globally optimal. We adopted a game theoretic approach to derive
the optimal service demands. Furthermore, to address practical
considerations, we use a stochastic programming technique to
handle uncertainty that is often encountered in real life situations.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the vast penetration of smartphones with a variety of
built-in sensors such as GPS, accelerometers and cameras,
participatory sensing has emerged recently as a promising
approach to large-scale data collection. Compared to the case
of deployed sensors, participatory sensing removes the cost of
installing and maintaining sensors and their inter-connection,
while achieving much broader geographical coverage. The
challenge of prolonging network lifetime in traditional sensor
networks is no longer an issue in participatory sensing as the
node battery is now taken care of by participating users them-
selves. Hence, participatory sensing is considered a promising
new sensing paradigm and has attracted extensive attention
and research efforts [1]–[3].
However, the success of participatory sensing strongly relies
on user participation to provide a sufficient and continuous
influx of user contributions. So far, most participatory sensing
studies, such as those mentioned above, focus on the sensing
tasks per se, while the participating users are recruited on a
voluntary or remunerated basis, which is not sustainable in the
long run in real-life scenarios.
This brings forth the important issue of incentive, which acts
as a driving force for participatory sensing. In this paper, we
∗Tie Luo is now with the Networking Protocols Department, Institute for
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Fig. 1: An illustrative participatory sensing application: traffic
monitoring.
adopt a demand-based principle to design incentive schemes,
by leveraging on the duality of a user’s role: each user is a data
contributor as well as a service consumer. We propose a par-
ticipatory sensing framework consisting of data contributors
and service consumers with a service provider that processes
the contributed data and packages them into useful services
that are consumed by service consumers. As an example, let
us consider the case of traffic monitoring [3] (see Fig. 1). A
smartphone user, when traveling on a bus or car, can act as a
contributor of traffic data (e.g., GPS traces, bus crowd levels,
etc.) to a service provider via a network connection (e.g.,
WiFi, GPRS, 3G, etc.). The service provider then aggregates
and processes the data from all contributors and, thereby,
provides a real-time traffic information service (e.g., browsing
or querying on road jams, bus crowdedness, estimated time to
reach destination etc.) for users to consume. Other applications
include air pollution or noise level monitoring and flood or
fire alerts, in which the required data are obtained from users’
handset sensor readings or are entered by the users.
In all such cases, a user plays a dual role as a contributor
as well as a consumer. Thus, we can exploit users’ demand to
consume useful and compelling services to design incentive
schemes. In principle, a service provider will grant each
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user a service quota, which determines how much service
he can consume, based on the user’s consumption demand
and his supply, i.e. contribution, level. The rationale is to
provide, in addition to prior credit-based and reputation-based
paradigms, another incentive design approach whereby making
contributions is motivated by each user’s intrinsic demand
to consume services that, conversely, is based on all users’
contributions.
When users’ demand for services is of concern, there are
two key questions to pose: How fairly will each individual
user be satisfied? How well will all the users as a whole
be satisfied? Accordingly, we consider two objectives in
designing concrete incentive schemes: maximizing fairness
and maximizing social welfare. For fairness, we design an
incentive with demand fairness (IDF) scheme which is max-
min fair and can score close to 1 on the Jain’s fairness
index. For social welfare, we design an iterative tank filling
(ITF) scheme which achieves a unique Nash equilibrium that
is simultaneously Pareto and global optimal, when a game-
theoretic approach is taken. In addition, we use chance con-
strained programming, a stochastic programming technique,
to handle uncertainty in real-life settings. Finally, we evaluate
the performance of our schemes via simulations. Our results
demonstrate the effectiveness of these schemes in meeting
their respective objectives and confirm the theoretical results
of our analysis.
II. RELATED WORK
In the context of wireless ad hoc networks, incentive was
studied as a means to stimulate each node to forward packets
for other nodes, under the assumption that nodes are self-
interested and try to conserve their own energy and trans-
mission bandwidth. The approaches can be broadly classified
into credit-based and reputation-based categories. For instance,
Buttya´n and Hubaux [4] proposed a credit-based mechanism
using a virtual currency called nuglet: forwarding one packet
for others will earn one nuglet while sending one own packet
will consume one nuglet. Marbach [5], on the other hand,
added flexibility by allowing each node to freely decide on a
forwarding price as well as sending rate in an adaptive manner.
In reputation-based systems such as [6], each node’s behavior
is observed and evaluated by its neighbors and will further
induce rewards or punishments based on the evaluation.
These approaches do not readily apply in our context of
participatory sensing as users do not interact with each other
directly but with a service provider (see Fig. 1). Furthermore,
our goal is not to stimulate cooperation among users but to
attract more user contributions.
Recently, Park and van der Schaar [7] introduced an inter-
vention device that can take a variety of actions to influence
users to cooperate and avoid inefficiency, under the assumption
that the device can monitor a random access network, such
as a CSMA network, perfectly. In our work, we focus on a
different context, participatory sensing, and will show that our
designed scheme achieves Pareto efficiency.
To the best of our knowledge, there are two studies that
specifically address incentive for participatory sensing. Lee
and Hoh [8] proposed a dynamic pricing mechanism that
allows users to sell their sensing data to a service provider. In
order to keep the service provider’s cost low while retaining
an adequate number of participants, they proposed an auction
mechanism to keep the bid price competitive while using
“virtual participation credits” to retain participants. Our work
does not use monetary incentive but leverages the dual role
a user plays, thereby motivating users with their intrinsic
demand for service. Furthermore, the techniques we use to
tackle this problem are all different from those used by Lee
and Hoh. The other work was a pilot study conducted in
UCLA by Reddy et al. [9] which looked into the effect of
micro-payments in participatory sensing. The study found that
monetary incentive is beneficial if combined with altruism and
competitiveness, and participants were very concerned with
fairness (which was left not addressed). In this paper, we not
only use a different incentive scheme, but we also place great
emphasis on and address the issue of fairness.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
The system consists of N users and a service provider. Each
user is a data contributor as well as a service consumer. The
service provider receives user contributed data and performs
processing such as complex data mining or simple data fusion,
at a server farm or computing cloud, and provides a value-
added information service to the users.
We consider the case where time is slotted. In each slot, a
user i ∈ [1..N ] is characterized by a quadruple 〈ψi, ci, Qi, qi〉,
where ψi is the user’s contribution level in this slot,1 ci is the
cost (e.g., mobile data charges and battery drainage) incurred
by the user, Qi is the amount of service the user demands (in
units of, e.g., hours) to consume in the next slot, which he
declares anytime in the current slot, and qi (qi ≤ Qi) is the
service quota that the service provider grants to the user (at
the end of the current slot after calculating ψi), up to which
he can actually use in the next slot.
In each slot, the service provider will provide a total amount
Qtot of service quota, e.g., in units of person-hours, to all the
users. This constant amount can either be fixed or vary from
slot to slot; in the latter case, the service provider can leverage
this to encourage more contribution by associating Qtot with
the quality of service (QoS) of the system, denoted by Ψ,
such that higher Ψ will lead to higher Qtot.2 The QoS Ψ is
determined by the aggregate amount of all users’ contribution.
Since the expression of Ψ is application dependent, so for
the sake of generality, our subsequent analysis will not be
coupled with any specific expression of Ψ. Rather, we only
1There are various ways to evaluate a user’s contribution level, which is
application dependent. One such example is using the value of information
(VoI) [10].
2For example, let Qtot = max{1,Ψ/Ψ∗} × Qmax where Ψ∗ is the
system-targetted QoS and Qmax is the maximum service quota the system
can provide (due to, e.g., system capacity and network bandwidth). As Ψ is
determined at the end of each slot, Qtot is also determined then and will be
consumed in the next slot.
IEEE SECON 2012 3
assume that QoS is positively correlated to the amount of
users’ contributions and that a single user does not noticeably
affect QoS. In other words, Ψ can be viewed as constant with
respect to an individual ψi provided that the user population
is sufficiently large.
Therefore, the problem is to assign an amount Qtot of
service quota to N users according to their characterizing
quadruple, with the objective of maximizing fairness (Sec-
tion IV) or social welfare (Section V).
IV. INCENTIVE WITH FAIRNESS
From an individual user’s perspective, one would expect
a “fair” rewarding scheme when consuming the service. In
accordance with the demand-based principle, the fairness here
is defined as that a user i’s received service quota qi is com-
mensurate with both his contribution level ψi and his demand
Qi.3 This section designs an incentive scheme called Incentive
with Demand Fairness (IDF) to achieve this objective.
Let us first consider a simpler incentive scheme which grants
qi based on ψi only. To do this, we gradually increase qi for
each user i at the differentiated rate of ψi/
∑N
l=1 ψl. Once a
user’s demand Qi is reached, we exclude this user and proceed
with the rest of the users in the same way, but with an updated
Qtot. This process can be mathematically described, by re-
indexing the users by j = 1, ..., N in ascending order of Qi/ψi
(which is the order in which the users will be fully satisfied),
as:
qj = min{Qj , ψj∑N
k=j ψk
× (Qtot −
j−1∑
k=1
qk)}. (1)
Next, we consider the scheme by also taking demand into
account. Naturally, it is fair to grant qi such that qi/Qi is
proportional to ψi when neither of the limits, Qi and Qtot,
is reached. One way to do this is, by mimicking the case
above, to increase qi/Qi at the rate of ψi/
∑N
l=1 ψl until 1 is
reached. However, this does not readily lead to a mathematical
or algorithmic abstraction because, unlike in Eq. (1) where∑N
i=1 qi is capped by Qtot, the upper bound to
∑N
i=1 qi/Qi
is not clear when
∑N
i=1Qi > Qtot. Therefore, instead, we
increase each qi at the rate of Qiψi/
∑N
l=1Qlψl until reaching
Qi, whereby the user with the largest ψi will obtain the
maximal qi/Qi first, which fulfills the objective. Thus, the
scheme can be formulated below, by sorting the users in
descending order of ψi and re-indexing them by j = 1, ..., N :
qj = min{Qj , Qjψj∑N
k=j Qkψk
(Qtot −
j−1∑
k=1
qk)}. (2)
This is the IDF scheme which is algorithmically presented as
Algorithm 1.
To analyze the properties of IDF, we consider two important
and well-established fairness measures, Jain’s fairness index
[11] and max-min fairness. Jain’s fairness index is defined as
J =
(
∑N
i=1 xi)
2
N
∑N
i=1 x
2
i
3Contribution cost ci will be considered in Section V.
Algorithm 1 Incentive with Demand Fairness (IDF)
Require: N,Qtot, ~Q = {Qi}, ~ψ = {ψi}
Ensure: ~q = {qi}
1: if
∑N
i=1Qi ≤ Qtot then
2: return ~q ← ~Q
3: end if
4: create ~I = {Ij}Nj=1, Ij ∈ [1, N ], such that ψI1 , ψI2 , ...ψIN
are in descending order
5: for j = 1→ N do
6: qIj = Qtot
QIjψIj∑N
k=j QIkψIk
7: if qIj > QIj then
8: qIj ← QIj
9: end if
10: Qtot− = qIj
11: end for
where, in our context, xi , qi/q∗i in which q∗i is the
optimal (i.e., fairest) service quota to be granted to user
i. The maximum of Jain’s fairness index is 1, achieved
when xi = xj ,∀i, j. In line with our objective of fairness,
q∗i = Qiψi (ignoring a constant coefficient which does not
affect the result). Thus,
J =
(
∑N
i=1
qi
Qiψi
)2
N
∑N
i=1(
qi
Qiψi
)2
. (3)
Without loss of generality, suppose there are k (0 ≤ k ≤ N )
users who are fully satisfied, and all the users are sorted as in
(2) and indexed by j. It is fairly straightforward to show that
qj =
{
Qj , j = 1, ..., k
h×Qjψj , j = k + 1, ..., N
where
h =
Qtot −
∑k
j=1Qj∑N
j=k+1Qjψj
and k is determined by 1/ψk ≤ h < 1/ψk+1. Hence,
J =
[
∑k
j=1 ψ
−1
j + (N − k)h]2
N [
∑k
j=1 ψ
−2
j + (N − k)h2]
. (4)
We will evaluate Eq. (4) for IDF and several other schemes
in Section VI through simulations. Here, we give two special
simple cases that can be theoretically solved:
• k = 0 ⇒ J = 1: in this case, the maximum fairness
is achieved, and all users are equally satisfied. The
expression for h is h = qi/(Qiψi) = Qtot/
∑N
l=1Qlψl.
• k = N ⇒ J = (∑Ni=1 ψ−1i )2/(N∑Ni=1 ψ−2i ): in this
case, all users are fully satisfied, and J = 1 if all the
users contribute equally.
The result for the other fairness measure, max-min fairness,
is given below.
Proposition 1. The IDF scheme achieves weighted max-
min fairness. That is, increasing user i’s demand-normalized
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service quota, qi/Qi, weighted by 1/ψi, viz. qi/(Qiψi), must
be at the cost of decreasing some other user j’s qj/(Qjψj),
where qj/(Qjψj) < qi/(Qiψi).
V. INCENTIVE WITH SOCIAL WELFARE MAXIMIZATION
From a system perspective, we consider the objective that
the service provider aims to maximize social welfare, where
social welfare is defined as the aggregate user utility with
respect to the service provided by the system. In the meantime,
the system shall also incentivize users to contribute at higher
levels. Therefore, the objective is formulated as maximizing
S ,
∑N
i=1 ψiui, the aggregate contribution-weighted user
utility, where ui is user i’s utility. The structure of this
objective function implies that priority will be given to users
with larger ψi.
The utility ui can be defined as one of two possible forms:
(a) ui = U(Ψ
qi
ciQi
), (b) ui = U(Ψ
qi
Qi
)/ci. (5)
In (a), qi/(ciQi) is a user’s demand-normalized service quota
(qi/Qi) evaluated against cost ci. Ψ is the system QoS, as
described earlier. U(x) : R+ → R is a utility function
monotonically increasing and strictly concave in x, which
reflects the elasticity of user satisfaction as is common in
the literature. In this paper, we consider the form of U(x) =
log(1 + x), x ≥ 0 [5], [12], [13], and thus the problem is
formulated below as a nonlinear programming problem:
maximize: (a) S =
N∑
i=1
ψi log(1 + Ψ
qi
ciQi
), or (6)
maximize: (b) S =
N∑
i=1
ψi log(1 + Ψ
qi
Qi
)/ci, (7)
s.t. qi ∈ [0, Qi], ∀i = 1, ..., N (8)
N∑
i=1
qi ≤ Qtot. (9)
In this section, we design a scheme to solve problem (a)
while leaving problem (b) to [14] for interested readers, since
both problems follow the same line of reasoning and (b) turns
out to be simpler than (a). Now, let us consider Eq. (6). In order
to maximize S, the solution should give priority to users with
larger marginal weighted utility, i.e., larger ψiΨ/(ciQi+qiΨ)
(qi being the optimizing variables), or equivalently, smaller
( ciQiΨ +qi)/ψi. With this point of view, we convert the original
NLP problem into a problem of “filling iced tanks” depicted in
Fig. 2. Each user i is represented by a tank with bottom area
ψi, and the tank has been preoccupied by frozen ice of volume
ciQi/Ψ (and hence of height ciQiΨ /ψi). Tank i is left with an
empty space of volume Qi (and hence of height Qi/ψi) to
be filled with water. All the tanks are placed back to back
as if they are virtually connected without internal separators.
Consequently, the empty space will be filled consecutively
in the order of 1©, 2©, 3©,... shown in Fig. 2. To solve the
problem,4 we design an iterative tank filling (ITF) algorithm
which iteratively fills the space in the depicted order until all
the tanks are fully filled or the total volume of water, Qtot, is
used up. The pseudo-code is given in Algorithm 2.
Fig. 2: Filling iced tanks. The tanks are sorted in ascending
order of height, but the ice (gray area) levels are not necessar-
ily in order. Numbers 1©, 2©, 3©,... denote the order of empty
spaces to be filled, which also correspond to the iteration
number of the ITF algorithm.
Proposition 2. The computational complexity of ITF is
O(N2).
Proof: In the worst case, icei and tanki are all different
(i.e., 2N distinct numbers), and hence each iteration will
increase the highest water level to only one of these 2N
numbers. Therefore, The main loop will execute at most
2N−1 times. Inside the main loop, lines 7-10, 20, and 25 each
has a complexity of O(N). The proposition is thus proven.
Theorem 1. Service provisioning via ITF ensures that, for any
i, j, if
ψi
ciQi
≥ ψj
cjQj
∧ ci ≤ cj , then ui ≥ uj .
Proof: Consider two cases of the output ~q:
1) qi/ψi ≥ qj/ψj (Fig. 3a). Multiplying this with ψiciQi ≥
ψj
cjQj
gets qiciQi ≥
qj
cjQj
. Hence U(Ψ qiciQi ) ≥ U(Ψ
qj
cjQj
)
(for any non-decreasing function U(·)), i.e., ui ≥ uj .
2) qi/ψi < qj/ψj . Since ψiciQi ≥
ψj
cjQj
⇔ ciQiΨ /ψi ≤
cjQj
Ψ /ψj , meaning that the reciprocal of marginal
weighted utility or the ice level of i is lower than
that of j, priority will be given to i (ITF will start
filling tank i earlier than j). However, since the outcome
is qi/ψi < qj/ψj , it implies that tank i must have
been fully filled and the height of original empty space
Qi/ψi < Qj/ψj , as shown in Fig. 3b. As ci ≤ cj , we
4This iced-tank filling problem is different from the water filling (WF)
problem in convex optimization [15] or wireless communications [16] in that
(i) these tanks can have different water levels during and after filling, because
each tank comes with a closed “lid” due to the constraint qi ≤ Qi, whereas
WF fills a single and open vessel with one sweeping water level, (ii) WF will
fully allocate the total resource (power) which however is not the case in ITF.
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Algorithm 2 Iterative Tank Filling (ITF)
Require: N,Qtot,Ψ, ~Q = {Qi}, ~ψ = {ψi},~c = {ci}
Ensure: ~q = {qi}
1: if
∑N
i=1Qi ≤ Qtot then
2: return ~q ← ~Q
3: end if
4: ~q ← ~0; ice← {icei = ciQi/(ψiΨ)};
tank← {tanki = ciQi/(ψiΨ) +Qi/ψi}
5: while Qtot > 0 do
6: ———— Find space to fill in this iteration ————
7: bot← mini{icei}; botind← arg mini{icei}
8: w ←∑i∈botind ψi //bottom area
9: cap1 ← mini/∈botind{icei}
10: cap2 ← mini{tanki}
11: h← min{cap1, cap2} − bot //height
12: —– Fill the space which may span multiple tanks —–
13: if w · h < Qtot then
14: Qtot− = w · h
15: else {the last iteration of filling}
16: h← Qtot/w //readjust height
17: Qtot ← 0
18: end if
19: for all i ∈ botind do
20: icei+ = h; qi+ = h · ψi
21: end for
22: ——————— Remove full tanks ———————–
23: if cap2 ≤ cap1 or cap1 =∞ then
24: for all k ∈ {i|tanki = cap2} do
25: tankk ←∞; icek ←∞
26: end for
27: end if
28: end while
(a) Case 1. (b) Case 2.
Fig. 3: Proof of Theorem 1.
have 1/ci = qiciQi ≥ 1/cj ≥
qj
cjQj
⇒ log(1 + Ψci ) ≥
log(1 + Ψ
qj
cjQj
)⇒ ui ≥ uj .
Corollary 1. Service provisioning via ITF ensures that, for
any i, j, if
ψi
Qi
≥ ψj
Qj
∧ ci ≤ cj , then ui ≥ uj .
Corollary 1, as a relaxed form of Theorem 1, shows that a
user who makes higher contribution with respect to his demand
and incurs lower cost, will be guaranteed higher utility.
For completeness, we briefly explain how the service
provider calculates users’ costs, ~c. The major component of ci
is the mobile data charge incurred by the user when making
a contribution. This can be calculated using the user’s mobile
data plan obtained from the user’s registration information, the
time of the contribution and the amount of data contributed,
which can be easily measured at the server. The other minor
component is the user’s battery drainage, which can be gauged
from the user’s phone model and amount of data contributed.
The service provider can then feed back the calculated cost ci
to the corresponding user.
Expanding on our proposed demand-based approach, we
now address two other major issues in the following sub-
sections.
A. Optimal Service Demands
One issue is to derive the optimal service demands, Qi, that
users declare. This is of interest because of the following. As
each user’s service quota is capped by his declared demand,
a user may be tempted to declare a higher demand in order
to, possibly, get a larger share of service quota. On the other
hand, as an incentive scheme should be transparent to users, a
user can realize from ITF that declaring a higher demand can,
conversely, put him into a disadvantageous situation in which
he will be classified as a “hard-to-satisfy” user and given a
lower priority to receive service. Therefore, there should exist
an optimal service demand for each user.
There are two ways to define the optimality: (i) global
optimality—the objective function (6) achieves the maximum
over the entire domain of optimization variables; (ii) Pareto
optimality—no user’s utility can be improved without making
some other user’s utility worse off. These two kinds of
optimality are not achieved simultaneously in general.
In addition, it is also desirable to make the optimal point
“stable”: any user should not have incentive to deviate from
his optimal demand unilaterally, i.e., if other users stick to
their optimal demands.
Under these circumstances, a game-theoretic approach is
appropriate. This sub-section derives the solution and shows
that it achieves all of the aforementioned properties: global
maximal, Pareto optimal, and Nash Equilibrium.
We model the participatory sensing problem as a non-
cooperative game [17]. The game players are the N users.
Each player’s strategy is to decide how much demand, i.e., Qi,
to declare and his strategy space is R+. Each user’s payoff
is his utility (by receiving the service quota granted by the
service provider). The game rule, prescribed by ITF, maps a
N -tuple of user strategies ~Q = {Qi} ∈ (R+)N to a N -tuple of
user payoffs ~u = {ui} ∈ (R+)N , by determining the service
quota ~q.
A common game-theoretic approach is to find a strategy
profile, prove it to be a Nash Equilibrium (NE), and sub-
sequently prove uniqueness if possible. We take a different
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approach: we first find the necessary and sufficient conditions
for a NE, and then derive the NE and prove uniqueness in one
go.
Lemma 1. The necessary and sufficient conditions that a Nash
Equilibrium of the above-defined game satisfies are{
C1 :
∑N
i=1Qi = Qtot
C2 : hi = hj , ∀i, j = 1, ..., N
(10)
where hi = Qi/ψi + ciQi/(Ψψi).
Proof: Necessity: Prove by contradiction as follows.
Condition C1: Suppose, instead,
∑N
i=1Qi < Qtot, then qi =
Qi,∀i. Obviously, one can increase his Qi to Q′i > Qi and
be granted q′i > qi provided that other users do not change
strategy. If, otherwise,
∑N
i=1Qi > Qtot, there is at least one
tank that is not fully filled. Let k be one such tank and bk =
ckQk/(Ψψk) denote its ice level. Let hi be tank i’s ice+water
level and hmax = maxi{hi|qi > 0}. In one case that bk ≥
hmax (i.e., qk = 0), clearly user k can decrease demand Qk
such that bk drops to b′k < hmax, and be granted q
′
k > 0.
In the other case that bk < hmax (i.e., 0 < qk < Qk), k can
decrease Qk to Q′k such that qk < Q
′
k < Qk and, accordingly,
ice level bk drops to b′k = ckQ
′
k/(Ψψk), and be granted: (i)
q′k > qk if ∃j : qk/ψk + b′k < hj ≤ hmax, where the left hand
side (qk/ψk + b′k) is k’s ice+water level as if his water level
remains unchanged, or (ii) q′k = qk otherwise (such j does not
exist; i.e., k is the only partially-filled tank (0 < qk < Qk)
and the rest of the tanks are either fully filled (with their hj ≤
qk/ψk + b
′
k) or empty (with their hj > hmax)). In summary,
user k will have an incentive to deviate from his strategy if∑N
i=1Qi 6= Qtot. Therefore,
∑N
i=1Qi = Qtot must hold.
Condition C2: Suppose ∃i, j : hi 6= hj , and WLOG, hi <
hj . Since
∑N
i=1Qi = Qtot, all the users are fully satisfied.
Recall that hi and hj are the ice+water level of users i and
j, respectively. If user i increases his demand (slightly) to
Q′i such that h
′
i = Q
′
i/ψi + ciQ
′
i/(Ψψi) < hj still holds,
then, according to the ITF game rule, user i will be granted
q′i > qi = Qi where the additional quota essentially comes
from user j (and others, if any). This means that user i will
have an incentive to change his strategy unilaterally. Hence,
Condition 2 must also hold.
Sufficiency:
If both C1 and C2 are satisfied, all the tanks have the same
height and are fully filled. Suppose any user, say i, changes
his strategy such that: (1) Q′i > Qi, then i’s ice level will
increase, which actually lowers i’s priority to receive service.
On the other hand, all the other tanks are fully filled. Hence,
tank i will continue to have the same volume, Qi, of water
(though its ice+water level will be above the other tanks) with
an empty space of Q′i − Qi left in the tank; (2) Q′i < Qi,
then obviously he will receive a lower quota of q′i = Q
′
i.
In summary, user i will either be indifferent (in case 1) or
unwilling (in case 2) to switch his strategy. Hence, a strategy
profile satisfying both C1 and C2 is a NE.
Theorem 2. The optimal strategy profile Q∗ = {Q∗i } where
Q∗i =
ψi/(Ψ + ci)∑N
l=1
ψl
Ψ+cl
Qtot (11)
is a unique Pareto-efficient Nash equilibrium, and achieves the
global optimum.
Proof: It can be shown that the equation system (10) can
be translated into a N × N homogeneous system of linear
equations whose determinant is non-zero. Hence, this system
has a unique solution which is then obtained to be Eq. (11).
The Pareto efficiency follows from C1 of Lemma 1.
Under the NE strategy (11), qi = Qi and each user receives
the maximum utility umaxi = log(1+Ψ/ci) for given ~ψ and ~c.
This achieves the global maximum of (6) term-wise, which is
a sufficient condition for (6) to achieve its global maximum:
Smaxa =
N∑
i=1
ψi log(1 + Ψ/ci). (12)
In practice, the service provider shall announce each user’s
contribution level ψi and cost ci, as well as the total quota Qtot
and system QoS Ψ, for each user to calculate his optimal Q∗i .
B. Uncertainties in Service Demands
The other issue is to handle uncertainty which is commonly
encountered in reality. As demands are essentially future
demands, or specifically, Qi is the amount of service a user
plans to consume in the next slot, a user needs to estimate his
actual demand. Denote the (unknown) actual demand in the
next slot by Q˜i, which is a random variable, and the estimated
demand by Qˆi. Thus, the previously discussed Qi is actually
Qˆi, and Qˆi is the “expected value” of Q˜i. To reformulate
the problem by taking the actual demand Q˜i into account, it
is improper to replace the original constraint qi ≤ Qi with
qi ≤ Q˜i which essentially leads to qi ≤ inf{Q˜i} = 0. It is
also improper to replace qi ≤ Qi with qi ≤ Qˆi which will be
elaborated in Section V-B1. The proper way is to introduce
probabilistic constraints, such as
Pr(qi ≤ Q˜i) ≥ 1− αi, ∀i = 1, ..., N (13)
where αi’s are prescribed probabilities. Each of these N
constraints means that qi is capped by (all the realizations
of) Q˜i in 1− αi of the time, or alternatively, qi has a chance
of αi to exceed Q˜i.
The inequality (13) imposes individual chance constraints
on the objective function, where “individual” relates to the fact
that each stochastic constraint qi < Q˜i is transformed into a
chance constraint individually. A variant is called joint chance
constraints which, however, does not capture our problem
as well as (13). Hence, we leave the discussion to [14] for
interested readers.
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(a) EVM. 45 cases of over-provisioning. (b) EVM. Zoom-in view of users 1–10. (c) CCP method. 4 cases of over-
provisioning.
Fig. 4: Solving the chance constrained problem (14) using EVM and CCP, respectively. N=100 users. The staircase line
represents a realization of all the Q˜i’s. Blue dots are cases where qi ≤ Q˜i and red crosses are qi > Q˜i (over-provisioning).
The vertical axis stands for Q˜i and qi.
The original problem can be then reformulated as:
maximize S =
N∑
i=1
ψi log(1 + Ψ
qi
ciQˆi
),
s.t. Pr(qi ≤ Q˜i) ≥ 1− αi, ∀i = 1, ..., N,
qi ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, ..., N,
N∑
i=1
qi ≤ Qtot.
(14)
The objective function uses Qˆi instead of Q˜i (which is a
random variable), because a user’s utility is determined when
he is granted qi based on his declaration Qˆi, instead of Q˜i. We
also note that, with the introduction of the chance constraints
(13), a service provider has the option of giving another
incentive by associating αi with user contribution, e.g., letting
αi = α0ψi/
∑N
l=1 ψl where α0 is a scaling factor.
Assuming Q˜i ∼ N (Qˆi, σi), we set out to solve the
stochastic programming problem (14).
1) Expected-Value Method: One may be of the opinion that
the new formulation (14) is not much different from replacing
constraint (13) by qi ≤ Qˆi, which straightforwardly converts
(14) into the original (deterministic) optimization problem
whose solution is already given by ITF. This is called an
expected-value method (EVM) which uses E(Q˜i) = Qˆi to
simplify the constraints.
To examine whether EVM is suitable for our particular
problem, we conducted a simulation study for an hourly-
slotted system with N=100 users. For ease of description,
denote by U(a, b) the uniform distribution in interval (a, b),
and by Ntr(µ, σ, a, b) the truncated normal distribution with
mean µ and standard deviation σ and bounded in the range
of [a, b]. In the simulation setup, Qˆi = U(0, 1) (hour),
Q˜i = Ntr(Qˆi, 0.25Qˆi, 0, 1), contribution ψi = U(0, 1) (kb),
and cost ci = Ntr(ψi, ψi, 0, 3) (the expected cost is one
dollar per kb of contribution). The total service quota Qtot =
0.75
∑N
i=1 Qˆi and QoS Ψ = 10
−3∑N
i=1 ψi (Mb).
According to EVM, we simply replace the original Qi with
Qˆi to run the ITF algorithm. The results are shown in Fig. 4a,
where 45 out of 100 users were found to have exceeded
their actual demands Q˜i, which results in significant resource
wastage since a user would not consume more than his actual
demand. Zooming on users 1–10, we see in Fig. 4b that qi/Q˜i
can be as high as 212%. Therefore, these observations convey
that EVM can cause significant service over-provisioning and,
perhaps more importantly, the service provider has no control
over such over-provisioning. The consequence is that users
will lose incentive because any user is likely to be granted
a large share of service without commensurate contribution,
which works strongly against any incentive scheme.
2) Chance Constrained Programming: Now that we have
seen that EVM is not suitable for our particular problem
with uncertainty, we use the chance constrained programming
(CCP) [18] approach to tackle it.
For constraint (13), denote the CDF of Q˜i by Fi(·),
Pr(qi ≤ Q˜i) ≥ 1− αi ⇔ Fi(qi) ≤ αi.
Denote by γi(p) the quantile function of Qi, defined as
γi(p) , inf{τ |Fi(τ) ≥ p}.
As Fi(·) is monotonically increasing, it follows that
Fi(qi) ≤ αi ⇔ qi ≤ γi(αi). (15)
In order to solve for γi(αi), we use the probit function which is
the quantile function for the standard normal distribution and
can be computed via easy numerical computation or simple
table look-up. Denote by zα the α-quantile of the standard
normal distribution. Since Q˜i ∼ N (Qˆi, σi), we have (Q˜i −
Qˆi)/σi ∼ N (0, 1), and hence (15) can be transformed into
qi − Qˆi
σi
≤ zαi ⇔ qi ≤ Qˆi + σizαi , (16)
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where zαi can be obtained via numerical computation or
standard table lookup, e.g., z0.05 = −1.65, z0.025 = −1.96.
Thus, the chance constraints (13) are converted into de-
terministic constraints (16), thereby allowing us to develop
the solution algorithm, which we call ITF-CCP, by modifying
Algorithm 2 as follows:
• Input: replace ~Q with ~ˆQ = {Qˆi} and add ~σ = {σi}.
• Line 4: replace icei and tanki with icei = ciQˆi/(ψiΨ)
and tanki = ciQˆi/(ψiΨ)+(Qˆi+σizαi)/ψi, respectively.
We then run ITF-CCP with αi = 0.05 for the same 100
users as in EVM (and also the same realization of Q˜i, for a fair
comparison). The new set of results is shown in Fig. 4c, where
we see that there are only 4 cases of over provisioning. This is
consistent with the “exceeding” probability αi and shows that
the occurrences of service over-provisioning are now under
control.
A side effect is that, as Qˆ′i , Qˆi + σizαi < Qˆi, there will
be extra resources left when Qext , Qtot −
∑N
i=1 Qˆ
′
i > 0.
To overcome this, we allow qi to “burst” above Qˆ′i when
Qext > 0, but still cap qi by the actual demand Q˜i in order to
avoid over-provisioning. As Q˜i is only realized during service
consumption, we allocate Qext after a user has consumed
his granted quota in the subsequent slot (since qi is granted
at the end of the current slot), based on the first-come-
first-serve (FCFS) principle. Note that: (i) incentive is not
compromised because obtaining service via a burst is non-
guaranteed (opportunistic) as it depends on the availability
of Qext and other users’ service consumption, unlike the
guaranteed service quota granted by ITF-CCP, (ii) FCFS does
not lead to each user rushing to use up his granted quota in
order to take advantage of the burst, because a user will not
know the availability of Qext until he uses up his granted
service quota.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the four
proposed schemes, IDF, ITF, NE, and ITF-CCP, via simulation.
For a more meaningful comparison, we also add two baseline
schemes:
1) Equal Allocation (EA): all the users share the total
service quota equally, i.e., qi = Qtot/N .
2) Demand-based Allocation (DA): each user is granted
a service quota of qi = Qtot × Qi/
∑N
l=1Ql when∑N
l=1Ql > Qtot, and qi = Qi when
∑N
l=1Ql ≤ Qtot.
Similar to Section V-B, the system is hourly-slotted with
N=100 users. Qi = U(0, 1) (hour), Qtot = U(0.5, 1) ×∑N
i=1Qi, and the rest of the simulation setup is kept un-
changed. In the case of NE, Q∗i is computed according to
(11). In the case of ITF-CCP, if Qext > 0, users burst as
follows. Let ti ∈ U(qi, 1) be the time when a user uses up
his granted service quota qi, upon which he can realize via
server notification or query through server that there is extra
quota, and hence will try to maximize his own benefit by
continuously consuming service until he reaches his actual
demand Q˜i or Qext is used up. This is equivalent to running
a further round of ITF by setting Qtot = Qext, icei = ti,
tanki = ti + (Q˜i − ti)+, and ψi = 1.
A. Macro-level Performance
This sub-section evaluates performance at the system level,
in terms of Jain’s fairness index as defined by Eq. (3), and
social welfare as defined by Eq. (6).
(a) Jain’s fairness index. (b) Social welfare.
Fig. 5: Performance comparison between 6 schemes: EA, DA,
IDF, ITF, NE and ITF-CCP. The sample size for each data
point is 100. Error-bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
Fig. 5 presents the results. Each data point is averaged over
100 rounds of simulation, and we also plot upper and lower
95% confidence limits around the sample means.
In the fairness aspect, Fig. 5a clearly shows that the IDF
scheme outperforms the other schemes and closely approaches
the maximum of Jain’s index, 1, with a score of 0.92. As for
social welfare (Fig. 5b), the first observation, which is not
surprising, is that NE is the clear winner, as is theoretically
proven by Theorem 2. On the other hand, the Q∗i computed
by NE may not necessarily reflect users’ real needs, and hence
other schemes which allow users to declare their demands
should still be considered. In that case, ITF is the best scheme
and achieves 94% of the maximum that NE achieves. In the
case of coping with uncertainty, ITF-CCP achieves 85.2% of
the NE maximum. The reason for the slight drop is that ITF-
CCP takes stricter constraints to avoid over-provisioning when
demands are uncertain. Bursting, as an auxiliary mechanism,
only helps marginally, because (i) it only takes effect when
Qext > 0, which is a rare case because Qtot is usually well
below
∑N
i=1Qi, (ii) the maximum burst amount for each user
is capped by a limited amount of (Q˜i − ti)+, (iii) FCFS is
not optimized for maximizing social welfare (e.g., no priority
is given to users with larger marginal utility). These are the
trade-offs a service provider should take into consideration
when dealing with uncertainty.
Our results also show that none of the schemes is the best
in meeting its unintended objective, meaning that there does
not exist a “one-size-fits-all” solution. Therefore, the correct
objective should be carefully considered by a service provider
before making a decision on which scheme to employ.
B. Micro-level Performance
This sub-section zooms in to examine performance at the
individual users’ level. Specifically, we look at four represen-
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tative users summarized in Table I. The population size is
still N=100 and the remaining 96 users are all normal users
(the same as User 4). As user parameters are fixed in this
setting, it makes sense to exclude NE and ITF-CCP from
the comparison. System parameters remain the same as in
Section V-B.
TABLE I: Four representative users.
User Type Demand (hr) Contrib. (kb) Cost ($)
1 High-Demand 1 0.5 0.5
2 Low-Contribution 0.5 0.25 0.5
3 High-Cost 0.5 0.5 1
4 Normal 0.5 0.5 0.5
In Fig. 6a, we compare the service quota each user received
against his demand, i.e., qi/Qi. Under IDF, all users except for
User 2 reaches ∼75% which is the total service availability
level (recall that Qtot = 0.75
∑N
i=1Qi). User 2 contributes
only half of what the other users contributed, and, in return,
he is rewarded by 37.5%, which is also half that of the
others. This indicates an incentive that encourages higher user
contributions. User 1 benefits more in terms of absolute service
quota, qi, because IDF does not discriminate against high-
demand users. In sharp contrast, ITF grants users 1–3 zero
service. The reason is that they are classified as “hard-to-
satisfy” or “unwelcome” users, following the philosophy of
ITF. As such, priority is given to the remaining 97 (normal)
users who equally share Qtot and obtain a qi/Qi even slightly
higher than 75%.
(a) Demand-normalized service
quota.
(b) Individual user utility.
Fig. 6: Performance of four representative users.
Fig. 6b gives each user’s utility. From the above, it is
easy to understand that, under ITF, only User 4 receives
positive utility which is also slightly higher than the maximum
of other schemes. Under IDF, User 2 receives lower utility
corresponding to the lower qi as in Fig. 6a, User 3 receives
lower utility because of his higher cost as per the definition of
utility in Eq. (6),5 User 1 receives the same utility as normal
users because IDF tries to make qi/Qi commensurate with
ψi and thereby removes the difference between User 1 and
normal users.
5The approximately linear relationship in spite of the existence of log(·)
is because Ψ qi
ciQi
is small and log(1 + x) ∼ x for small x.
It is worth noting that, while User 2 is under-privileged
in both IDF and ITF, he (undesirably) obtains the same
amount of service as normal users under EA and DA. This
clearly demonstrates the advantage of the built-in incentive
mechanism in our designed schemes.
VII. CONCLUSION
We address the issue of incentive in participatory sensing
as it is of pivotal importance for actualizing this new sensing
paradigm. Instead of using monetary or reputational incentives,
we take a demand-based approach and motivate users through
regulated quantities of compelling services that they desire
to consume. To this end, we designed two schemes, IDF and
ITF, to address the key questions of how to incentivize users to
contribute and, at the same time, maximize fairness and social
welfare. Our theoretical and simulation investigations both
demonstrated the effectiveness of our designed schemes and
their desired properties. Two tailored variations, NE and ITF-
CCP, were also presented for two other scenarios of interest,
using a game-theoretic approach and a stochastic programming
technique, respectively.
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